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IT is surprising that the criminal appellate work of the federal courts
has hitherto escaped treatment as a separate subject in the exhaustive
literature dealing with problems of federal jurisdiction. The work of
the federal courts in the field of criminal law has been increasingly con-
spicuous in recent years. The most important single phase in this de-
velopment has been the spectacular effort of the Supreme Court in sev-
eral recent cases to ensure a fair trial in the state courts, especially to
Negroes, by a vigorous and 'orthodox application of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 The number of criminal cases
in the federal courts, and consequently the number of criminal appeals,
moreover, increased considerably with the enactment of the Volstead Act,
and more recent federal criminal legislation.2  In any event, a survey
to restate the present nature of criminal appellate practice is timely for
the special reason that the Supreme Court has promulgated a set of
rules for procedure in criminal cases.3
The development of criminal appeals in the federal courts has not dif-
fered widely from the growth of federal appellate practice in other cases.
There has been the tendency to grant a review as of right by an inter-
mediate federal court of appeal in criminal cases originating in the
federal courts, but to limit sharply the cases which can be appealed as
of right to the Supreme Court. Three methods of obtaining review of
criminal cases have been developed: by appeal as of right, discretionary
appeal, and by petition for habeas corpus. Appeal as of right in criminal
cases was formerly by "writ of error."4 But in the Act of January 31,
1928 review by writ of error was "abolished" and the term "appeal"
substituted to designate all appeals as of right.5
tAssociate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1. E.g. Patterson v. Alabama 294 U. S. 600 (1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 4S
(1932) (The Scottsboro Cases); Brown v. Mississippi, 56 Sup. Ct. 461 (1936); Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923).
2. Twenty statutes in the field of criminal law and procedure were enacted in the 73d
Congress. See REP. ATr' GEN. FOR 1934, p. 61. Of course, with the repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment, there was a decrease in the number of criminal cases in the federal courts
(id. at p. 3). Nevertheless in 1934, 34,152 criminal cases were commenced (id. at p. 2)
as compared with 12,495 in 1895, REP. Ar' Y GE . FOR 1895, p. 3, which in turn had shown
a considerable increase over preceding years. See also table evidencing increase in crim-
inal cases in Manton, Administration of Criminal Law in the Federal Courts, (1925) 50
A B. A. REP. 752, 762.
3. Rules of Practice and Procedure in Criminal Cases, promulgated by the Supreme
Court, 1934, 292 U. S. 660 (1934).
4. See DoBIE, FEDEaL PRocEDuRE (1928) 902 et seq.
5. 45 STAT. 54, 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 861a, 861b (1928). Some confusion was caused
by the fact that this statute was silent as to stays, security, scope of review and form of
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It seems strange that in the federal judiciary system as set up by the
Act of 1789, there was no provision for any appellate review in criminal
cases," either in the circuit courts or in the Supreme Court. A small
measure of review was first provided in 1802 when it became possible
for the circuit court, upon division of opinion, to certify questions to the
Supreme Court.7 And subsequently by the Act of 1879 provision was
made for appeal as of right by writ of error to the circuit courts from
the district courts, in all criminal cases where "the sentence is imprison-
ment, or fine and imprisonment, or where if a fine only, the fine shall
exceed . . . three hundred dollars."'  But there was as yet no right to
review by the Supreme Court" and this situation often resulted in in-
justice. For, it became the practice for a single judge to hold circuit
alone, and since two-thirds of the circuit work was left to district judges,
a single district judge was the ultimate appellate tribunal for all crimes
from the most trivial to capital offenses.' This situation existed until
the eighties when the movement for general social reform in the ad-
ministration of justice brought about the Act of 1889, which granted the
right of appeal by writ of error to any federal court in capital crimes.10
But the reformers were not satisfied, and proposals were soon made to
extend further the right to have decisions of the lower federal courts
reviewed by the Supreme Court.1 These culminated in the Judiciary
record to be used on those "appeals" which were formerly by "writ of error." This was
settled by the Act of April 26, 1928, 45 STAT. 466, 28 U. S. C. A. § 861b (1928) amend-
ing the earlier statute so as to restore the provisions of the "statutes regulating the right
to a writ of error, defining the relief which may be had thereon and prescribing the mode
of exercising that right and of invoking such relief, including the provisions relating to costs,
supersedeas and mandate . . ." See Frankfurter and Landis, The Supreme Court under th
Judiciary Act of 1925 (1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 1, 27; (1928) 41 HARv. L. Rrv, 673;
(1932) '32 COL. L. REv. 860.
6. 1 STAT. 73 (1789). § 11 provided that the circuit courts were to have appellate
jurisdiction in cases from the district courts, but § 22 limited it to civil cases. § 11 also
gave the circuit courts original jurisdiction in criminal cases that was concurrent with the
district courts in all crimes cognizable by them and exclusive in certain cases.
7. 2 STAT. 59 (1802).
8. 20 STAT. 354 (1879).
8'. United States v. More, 3 Cranch. 159 (U. S. 1805); Ex Parte Kearney, 7 Wheat.
38 (U. S. 1822). See sketch of history of federal criminal procedure in United States v.
Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 319 (1892), and in Manton, Criminal Law in the Federal Courts,
(1925) 50 A. B. A. REP. 752.
9. FRA x uRTm AND LANDIS, BusINEss OV ME SUPREz COURT (1927) 109. Moreover,
where the court was held by a single judge there was not even the possibility of obtaining
the opinion of the Supreme Court through certification of division of opinion. See
McCrary, Needs of the Federal Judiciary (1881) 13 CENT. L. 3. 167, 168. It is significant
that state courts during this period were willing to issue habeas corpus for prisoners con-
victed in federal courts. See 2 WAiREr, Surpmnxz COURT IN UmTED STATES HISTORY
(2nd ed. 1926) 332.
10. 25 STAT. 655 (1889).
11. The proposals made, and their sponsors, are listed in FRANI rJURTER AND LANDIS,
supra note 9, at 109 et seq.
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Act of 1891 which granted an appeal directly from the district court to
the Supreme Court in all cases of "infamous crimes." -12 Although the
drafters of the Act believed that this phrase included only crimes for
which the penalty was something more burdensome than short periods
of incarceration, the Supreme Court had previously given it a broader
interpretation, which it applied to the Act of 1891, construing it to
cover all offenses for whch the defendant might be sentenced to a
penitentiary, even though in fact only a fine was imposed.' 3
It was soon realized that the "reform" had been carried too far. The
Supreme Court was overburdened with petty and unimportant criminal
cases.' 4 Moreover, the Act of 1891 had provided an adequate appellate
review as of right in the newly established circuit courts of appeal.
Limitation upon appeal to the Supreme Court could therefore no longer
be unjust and in 1897, the right to have decisions of the inferior courts
reviewed by the Supreme Court was limited to cases involving capital
crimes.'" But the right of appeal directly to the Supreme Court even
as thus restricted was unnecessary, and in 1911 it was accordingly
abolished in the Judicial Code.17 Hence in criminal cases originating in
the federal courts, there is at present no appeal as of right to the Supreme
Court available to the defendant unless the decision of the circuit court
of appeals is one that comes within Section 240 (b) of the Judicial Code,
namely when the affirmance of the conviction in the circuit court of ap-
peals is based upon holding a state statute unconstitutional.' 8
But although a defendant thus has practically no right to review by
the Supreme Court of the decision of an inferior federal court, the
prosecution may even today in certain cases appeal to the Supreme Court
directly from the trial court. This privilege, first afforded by the
Criminal Appeals Act of 1907,'1 has survived the general tendency to
abolish appeal as of right to the Supreme Court since in its absence
inferior federal judges would be able virtually to nullify federal criminal
legislation."0 Moreover, making the appeal directly to the Supreme Court
12. 26 STAT. 827 (1891), 28 U. S. C. A. § 346 (1926).
13. In re Claasen, 140 U. S. 200 (1891).
14. See statements by Chief Justice Fuller, and Attorney-General Harmon in 23 Coo.
REc. 3285 (1892); SEN. REP. No. 265, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No. 3362 (1895). See al-o
REP. Aery GEN. roR 1893, xxv; id. OR 1894 mix.
15. 26 STAT. 826 (1891).
16. 29 STAT. 492 (1897).
17. 36 STAT. 1157 (1911).
18. 43 STAT. 938 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 347b (1926).
19. 34 STAT. 1246 (1907), 18 U. S. C. A. § 632 (1926). See (1907) 20 Haiv. L. REv.
219. Appeal of course does not lie after a verdict of not guilty, not even for the purpo:e
of ascertaining the law for future ases. United States v. Evans, 213 U. S. 297 (1909).
20. The inability of the government to take an appeal in the absence of statute
was first made definite in United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892). For the results
of this decision, see FANxro-aRm AND LmIS, supra note 9, at 114.
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expedites the construction of new criminal statutes so as to inform those
in charge of enforcement what their final construction will be."1
The right to have decisions of inferior federal courts reviewed, how-
ever, is only one aspect of the problem of appeal as of right to the
Supreme Court. The latter tribunal may also review on appeal criminal
cases arising in the state courts. Until 1925, defendants could take an
appeal as of right to the Supreme Court from the decisions of the
highest state courts in a considerable number of cases, 22 although there
was no appeal as of right from the federal courts during most of that
time, and the tendency to restrict appeal to the Supreme Court from
the state tribunals is generally more severe, for reasons of federalism,
than in the case of appeals from the federal courts. Since the Judiciary
Act of 1925, however, appeal as of right lies only in the two classes of
cases: when the validity of a state statute under the federal constitution
is challenged and sustained, or when a federal statute or treaty is in-
volved and its validity denied.23
Review in a criminal case by the Supreme Court of decisions of in-
ferior federal courts or of state courts may also be had within the dis-
cretion of the Supreme Court or a circuit court of appeals. A form of
discretionary appeal has always been present. Even when there was no
appeal as of right from the lower federal courts, the old circuit court
could certify questions to the Supreme Court;8 and this practice has
been continued for the circuit courts of appeal.24 In the Judiciary Act
of 1891, review of certain cases by the Supreme Court was for the
first time made dependent upon its own discretion. 2  The Supreme
Court could now issue a writ of certiorari to a circuit court of ap-
peals or to the highest court of a state, an adequate federal question
being present and properly preserved.2' Like most of its other business,
criminal appeals are now principally heard by the Supreme Court on
certiorari. 7
21. Taft, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the Act of February 13, 1925 (1925)
35 YALE L. J. 1, 6.
22. See § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 85, as interpreted in United States v.
More, 3 Cranch 159 (U. S. 1805); Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 434 (U. S. 1847); Twitchell v.
Commonwealth, 7 Val. 321 (U. S. 1868). See also Taft, supra note 21, at 8.
23. 43 STAT. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 344 (1926).
24. 26 STAT. 828 (1891), 28 U. S. C. A. § 346 (1926).
25. Taft, supra note 21, at 1.
26. The occasions on which certiorari will lie and the manner in which the federal
question must be preserved are the same as in civil cases. See 43 STAT. 937, 938 (1925), 28
U. S. C. A. §§ 344, 347 (1926).
27. Statistics are not available as to what percentage of the criminal eases heard by
the Supreme Court are on certiorari. But during the 1931, 1932 and 1933 terms all of the
criminal cases coming from the federal courts were heard on certiorari. See REP. or ATr'Y
GEN. FOR 1931, p. 13; FOR 1932 p. 7; FOR 1933, p. 7. It is also of interest as demonstmatlng
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The third method of obtaining review of a criminal case in the federal
courts is by petition for habeas corpus. Originally, the writ lay only
when the petitioner was detained under the authority of the United
States,2" but in 1867 it was made applicable wherever the detention
violated the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.p Thus,
habeas corpus was extended so as to provide an additional means for
review by the federal courts of decisions by state courts and the writ
has been most widely used in this connection. Of course, as is often said,
habeas corpus cannot serve the function of a writ of error; as a method
of collateral attack it is, at least nominally, to be confined to cases where
the judgment of the court is said to be void." But the federal court
may go outside of the record on writ of habeas corpus?' This attitude
taken by the Supreme Court in its treatment of habeas corpus cases,
coupled with the development of the principle that circumstances at-
tendant upon the trial may be so repugnant to constitutional ideals of
due process in procedure as to void the judgment of the court,' has
made habeas corpus an effective means for obtaining review of state
criminal cases in the federal courts. Habeas corpus, moreover, has the
advantage over appeal as of right or on certiorari to the state court, in
that the appellant avoids the necessity of showing that he has raised
the federal question in time.
Petitions for habeas corpus may be made in the district court and in
the Supreme Court, and to any federal judge or justice.' However,
the difficulty of obtaining a hearing in the Supreme Court in a criminal casse, that in the
tables given in the series of articles on the business of the Supreme Court, under the beading of
"Crimes and Forfeitures," only two petitions for certiorari were granted during the 1931 term
as compared with thirty denied; one granted and twenty-eight denied during the 1932 term;
four granted and forty-nine denied during the 1933 term and four granted and fifty-three
denied during the 1934 term. See articles by Frankfurter and Landis, (1932) 46 HAnv. L.
REV. 226, 252 and by Frankfurter and Hart, (1933) 4 HARv. L. Rav. 245, 261; (1934) 4S
HARv. L. REy. 238, 245; (1935) 49 HARv. L. RaV. 63, 81.
28. 1 STAT. 82 (1789).
29. 14 STAT. 385 (1867), 28 U. S. C. A. § 453 (1926).
30. Ashe v. United States, 270 U. S. 424 (1926); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309
(1915) noted (1915) 28 HARv. L. Rnv. 793.
31. Frank v, Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923)
noted (1923) 37 HARv. L. REv. 247; (1923) 9 VA. L. Rrv. 556; (1923) 33 YArx L. J. 82;
cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935). See Nutting, The Streme Court, The
Fourteenth Amendment and State Criminal Cases (1936) 3 U. or Cir. L. RMy. 244, 253; Scho-
field, Federal Courts and Mob Domination of State Courts: Leo Franf's Case (1916) 10
Irx. L. REV. 479.
32. First indicated in Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (U. S. 1873), and since then,
especially apparent in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923). See Comment (1935) 35
COL. L. RrFV. 404, 412. See also Waterman and Overton, Federal Habeas Corpls Statues
and Moore v. Dempsey (1933) 1 U. of C. L. REV. 307.
33. R. S. § 751, 28 U. S. C. A. § 451 (1926).
34. 43 STAT. 940 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 452 (1926). If the writ is refusd the
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original petitions for habeas corpus are rarely made in the Supreme
Court, prior petition to the inferior courts being regarded as a pre-
requisite to action by the Supreme Court.85 In this procedure it may
thus happen that district courts act as appellate tribunals for the purpose
of reviewing state court decisions. Nor is the decision of the district
court on the petition subject to review even by the circuit court of appeals
unless the district judge or a judge of the circuit court of appeals certifies
the presence of probable cause for the appeal."0 It is therefore natural that
the power of the federal courts to constitute themselves appellate tri-
bunals for reviewing decisions of state courts should be widely criticized
and that the Supreme Court should seek to place restraints upon its
exercise.37 The writ is regarded as a final and extraordinary remedy,
and it is said that the petitioner must show that he has exhausted all
available remedies," and that the state has failed to provide adequate
corrective judicial process.39 Accordingly, in the recent Mooney case,
the petition was dismissed although the merit of the petitioner's claim
was recognized, because he had not sought his remedy by state habeas
corpus.40 Although this decision and the rule of "exhaustion" which it
represents will promote delay in the execution of justice, it is probably
an inevitable concomitant of federalism, consistent with the political
custody of the prisoner is not to be disturbed pending the appeal, if allowed; but If the
lower court renders a final decision discharging the prisoner, he may be released within
the discretion of the trial judge. R. S. § 765, 28 U. S. C. A. § 464 (1926); Supreme Court
Rule 45, 275 U. S. 629 (1928). However, any proceedings against the prisoner before
habeas corpus proceedings are finally adjudicated and the appeals had, are null and void.
43 STAT. 940 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 465 (1926).
The prisoner may make successive applications for the writ to other federal judges on
the same grounds if his petition is denied by the district court, rulings on habeas corpus
not being res judicata, but merely "persuasive" on subsequent petition. Salinger v. Lolsel,
265 U. S. 224 (1924); Wong Doe v. United States, 265 U. S. 239 (1924); Comment (1935)
35 CoL. L. REv. 415.
35. An original Supreme Court writ will issue only in cases of "special urgency" which
is construed as confined to cases of detention under federal or foreign authority, In re
Neagle, 135 U. S. 1 (1890) (granted); Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U. S. 499 (1901)
(denied) ; see Ex Parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 251-252 (1886) (denied).
36. 43 STAT. 940, 942 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 466 (1926). Provision for appeal of the
final decision on habeas corpus is made in 43 STAT. 940 (1925), R. S. § 765, 28 U. S. C.
A. §§ 463, 464 (1926).
37. See Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184, 187 (1899); Baker v. Grtce, 169 U. S.
284, 290 (1898); United States v. Tyler, 269 U. S. 13, 17 (1925); DoaxE, F=PmtA, Pnto-
CEDURE (1928) 308 et seq.; Dobie, Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts (1927) 13 VA. L.
REv. 443; Williams, Federal Habeas Corpus (1924) 9 ST. Louis L. Rv. 250.
38. Ex Parte Royal, 117 U. S. 241 (1886); Cooke v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183 (1892);
Reid v. Louis, 187 U. S. 153 (1902); Goto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393 (1924). See also
(1936) 45 YA,. L. J. 543, 544.
39. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935).
See Comment (1935) 35 COL. L. REV. 404, 415.
40. 294 U. S. 103 (1935), noted (1935) 35 COL. L. Rav. 282.
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theory of dual sovereignty, and equitable in result, in that the supreme
court of the state in question is given an opportunity to pass upon the
issues which the petitioner claims to have deprived him of his right to
a fair trial, before the federal judiciary interferes in state administration
of justice.
The methods provided in the federal courts for review of criminal
cases are fair and practical. It is desirable for administrative reasons
that the occasions for appeal to the Supreme Court be sharply limited.
That tribunal cannot act as a court of review in ordinary criminal cases.4'
Limitations on the right to review by the Supreme Court may result in
injustice.42 But criminal cases originating in the federal courts are
subjected to review by at least one appellate tribunal, a circuit court of
appeals; in most cases there is no occasion for a second appeal. As re-
gards appeal of criminal cases from state courts, even stronger rea-
sons are present to justify limitations upon review by the Supreme
Court. A free right of appeal from the decision of the state court or
from that of an inferior federal court on petition for habeas corpus
would result in intolerable delays in the execution of criminal sentences.
The defendant has in all probability already enjoyed one appeal in the
state courts. To provide additional opportunities for review is to en-
courage the taking of appeals merely for the purpose of delay.43 But
an anxiety to avoid this abuse of federal criminal jurisdiction may result
in the anomaly of having the federal district court become the ultimate
court of review for the state supreme court, on a petition for habeas
corpus from which there is no right to appeal. This paradoxical result
is comparatively rare, but it could easily be avoided by granting the
state an appeal as of right to the circuit court of appeals where the de-
cision on habeas corpus is adverse to it, and then review by the Supreme
Court could be sought in the usual manner by certiorari. The solution
proposed is, however, open to the possible objection of effecting an in-
crease in the number of petitions to the Supreme Court for certiorari
and further delaying a final adjudication of the case.
But the ultimate problem of the writ of habeas corpus, and of other
devices for the review of state criminal cases by the federal courts, is the
political one of dividing power between state and nation. The Supreme
Court must be sensitive to the pride of local things in guiding the interfer-
ence of the federal judicial system into the administration of justice in
the state courts. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
41. See REP. ATr'Y Gm. FOR 1893, p. xxv; FOR 1895, p. 12; FRtnUzUaEn AZmo Lu.mws,
supra note 9, at 109 et seq.
42. See Nutting, supra note 31, at 260.
43. See Judicial Procedure of the Courts of the United States (1910) 35 A. B. A. REP.
624, 631; (1917) 3 A. B. A. J. 507, 509.
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has been a powerful, if erratic, weapon for the control of criminal pro-
cedure in the state courts. But it has been used sparingly, in deference
to the prestige of the federal principle." Ideas of comity explain, if they
cannot altogether justify, the harsh dismissal on a technicality of the
appeal in the Herndon case; 45 they dominate the treatment of the habeas
corpus in the Mooney case, and find vigorous fruition in Brown v,
Mississippi,4" where the Supreme Court took advantage of what it re-
garded to be a technically appropriate occasion to illustrate the poten-
tialities of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument of justice.
But the provision of opportunities for review, however adequate, de-
pends in a large measure for its effectiveness upon the manner in which
the review is obtained. And the appellate practice involved in obtaining
a review of a criminal case tried in the federal courts has long been in
need of reform. There is no federal code of criminal procedure, but
merely a number of separate statutes. The conformity act is not ap-
plicable and before the Supreme Court Rules, in the absence of a con-
trolling federal statute the parties had been compelled to 'follow the
common law criminal procedure as it existed in the jurisdiction where
the court was sitting at the time when the state was admitted into the
UIfion. 47  A confused and dilatory appellate practice had been de-
yeloped.4 8  The first step towards systematizing and clarifying federal
appellate practice was taken by the Act of February 24, 1933,40 as
amended on March 8, 1934, 50 giving the Supreme Court the power to
44. Best indicated, in the opinion of Justice Holmes when refusing habeas corpus In
the Sacco-Vanzetti case. See (1927) 12 MAsS. BAR. Q. No. 7, p. 27.
45. Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441 (1935), noted (1935) 35 COL. L. Rav. 1145.
Appeal on certiorari by a Communist Negro from the Supreme Court of Geoygla was
dismissed because the federal question was not raised in time. The case raised som doubts
that the Supreme Court would continue in the path marked out by the Scottsboro, cases
as the protector of the southern negro. These doubts have, however, been settled by the
more recent Brown v. Mississippi, 56 Sup. Ct. 461 (1936). There the appellant was a
negro but questions of 'radicalism were not involved.
46. 56 Sup. Ct. 461 (1936). The opinion in this case by Chief Justice Hughes Is
extremely emphatic in its assertions of determination not to permit "the State (to hurry)
the accused . . . to conviction under mob domination."
47. See Reid v. United States, 12 How. 361, 365 (U. S. 1851); Re Chateaugay Ore &
Iron Co., 128 U. S. 544, 553 (1888); Rothman v. United States, 270 Fed. 31, 35 (C. C. A.
2d, 1920); Blisse v. United States, 263 Fed. 961, 962 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920); cf. Rosen
v. United States, 245 U. S. 467 (1918). See also Hough, The Review of Criminal Causes in
the Courts of the United States (1926) 3 LEcrURES oN LEGAL Topics 51, 58; Matthews,
Federal Criminal Practice (1921) 2 LECUREs oz; LEa. TOPICS 421.
48. See Hough, supra note 47, at 50 et seq. A similarly confused situation exists at
present with respect to federal rules of evidence. See Ferguson and Callahan, Evidenuo
and New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 622.
49. 47 STAT. 904, 28 U. S. C. A. § 723a (1933).
50. 48 STAT. 399, 28 U. S. C. A. § 723a (1934). The Supreme Court's power to pro-
mulgate rules was extended by the Act of June 19, 1934, 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A, §§
732b, 723c (1934), to cover civil cases.
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frame rules of procedure in criminal cases after a verdict or finding of
guilt by the court if a jury has been waived, or after a plea of guilty.
The court was authorized to make these rules applicable to all federal
courts including the Supreme Court and to prescribe the "times for and
manner of taking appeals and applying for writs of certiorari and pre-
paring records and bills of exceptions and the conditions on which
supersedeas or bail may be allowed."
On May 26, 1933, Attorney-General Mitchell transmitted to Chief
Justice Hughes a set of rules prepared in the Department of Justice
under the direction of Solicitor General Thacher. Approximately one
year later the Supreme Court adopted the rules now in effect, differing
in a few respects from those proposed by the Attorney-General. The
rules were made applicable to all criminal cases in the federal courts
of the United States, but were not to govern appeals by the prosecution.
In many respects, they effected desirable and needed reforms.r1
The major defect in federal criminal appellate practice had been the
long intermission between the sentence and the final disposition of the
case. The defendant, generally out on bail, had every incentive to delay
the course of the appeal. The United States attorneys, engaged with the
trial of other cases, did not always insist upon prompt action. Sentences
often came long after verdicts. And the appellate practice then exist-
ing made possible and fostered dilatory tactics. The defendant was
allowed under statute a maximum of three months in which to take an
appeal and thirty day citation thereafter before argument."- In addi-
tion, extensions of time in which to file a bill of exceptions were granted
almost as of course. The failure of the circuit courts of appeal to dis-
pose promptly of motions for rehearing served further to halt the ad-
judication of the case, since certiorari does not lie until the motion s
settled. It is significant that the average time in fifty sample cases
between entry of judgment in the trial court and argument in the circuit
court of appeals was 343 days, and in some cases three years elapsed
before final adjudication. 3
The constitutional power of the Supreme Court to frame such rules is not here treated
but will be discussed in an article by Dean Charles E. Clark to appear in the Munmn,
LAW RErivw for June, 1936.
51. Rules of Practice and Procedure in Criminal Cases, promulgated May 7, 1934,
292 U. S. 660 (1934). The Court has not, however, exercised its power to make rules
as to criminal cases in the courts of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, Virgin
Islands and the United States Court for China, because of the absence of sufficient data.
52. Rmv. STAT. § 999, 43 STAT. 940 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 230, 350, 86S (1926).
When the appeal was to the Supreme Court under the Criminal Appeals Act only 30 days
were allowed. 34 STAT. 1246 (1907), 18 U. S. C. A. § S62 (1926).
53. Mitchell, Reform in Federal Criminal Procedure (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 732, 734;
Report of the Judicial Conference (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 824, 826; Address of Chef Jus-
tice Hughes to the American Law Institute (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 325, 326. Sm aLo Pno-
PosED RuLns GovEaR=G PRAcncE ND PRocsnupm n Cn;M.,% CASEs Pnu.tmn Tim
DEPATEN oF JusnicE -oN TassTnRrNs To = CIEF JusTIcE, May 26, 1933, at p. 11.
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The rules of practice as promulgated by the Supreme Court accordingly
attempt to hasten the course of the appeal."e Rule I requires that
sentence be imposed immediately after conviction, unless a motion either
for withdrawal of plea of guilty, in arrest of judgment, or for a new
trial is pending. Motions after conviction are, moreover, to be made and
determined promptly. A motion in arrest of judgment or for a new
trial must be made within three days after conviction. But if the
motion for a new trial is based solely upon the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence, it may be offered within sixty days after final judg-
ment irrespective of the expiration of the term at which the judgment
was rendered. Similarly, motions to withdraw pleas of guilty must be
made within ten days after the entry of the plea and before sentence is
imposed.55 Since the motions after sentence are thus hastened, Rule
III, limiting the time for filing the notice of appeal, can be effective.
It provides that appeal may be taken only within five days after entry
of judgment of conviction, but with the exception that where a motion
for a new trial has been made, appeal may lie within five days after the
entry of the order denying the motion.
The rules prescribing the manner in which the appeal is to be taken
demonstrate that the court is attempting not only to hasten the course
of the appeal but to clarify and simplify federal appellate practice in
criminal cases. Thus petitions for allowance of appeal and citations are
abolished together with the dilatory and technical practice which sur-
rounded their use. Under the new rules, a notice of appeal is to be filed
in duplicate with the clerk of the trial court and a copy of the notice is
to be served upon the United State attorney. The notice should set forth
the title of the case, the names and addresses of the appellant and his
attorney, a general statement of the nature of the offense charged, the
date of the judgment from which the appeal is being taken, the sentence
imposed, and, if the appellant is in custody, the prison where he is con-
fined. The fact that the defendant is taking an appeal as well as the
grounds therefor are to be succinctly stated." The clerk of the trial
court is to forward one copy of the notice of appeal to the clerk of the
circuit court of appeals,57 and also inform the trial judge of the appeal.
The latter thereupon is at once to direct the appellant or his attorney to
appear before him, together with the prosecutor, for the- purpose of
giving directions for preparing the record on appeal. 8
$4. The rules are set forth in 292 U. S. 660 (1934).
55. Rule II.
56. Rule I. The forms to be used for notice of appeal are appended to the rules.
57. Rule IV. After the notice has been filed in the appellate court, the latter tribunal
is in full charge of the case. Under Rule IV, the clerk of the trial court is also to forward




The rules recognize two methods of taking an appeal and give the ap-
pellant the option of including a bill of exceptions in the record on ap-
peal. When the appeal is prosecuted upon the clerk's record of pro-
ceedings without a bill of exceptions, the appellant should promptly file
with the clerk of the trial court an assignment of errors." If the review
is to be upon bill of exceptions, he is to file the bills of exceptions with the
trial court clerk in addition to the assignment of errors within the time
allotted by the trial judge, which cannot exceed thirty days. It is
specifically provided that the trial judge is to settle the bill of excep-
tions as promptly as possible and to grant an extension of the time
within which the bill can be filed only in unusual cases."°
The assignment of error and the bill of exceptions, if used, are im-
mediately forwarded by the clerk of the trial court to the clerk of the
court in which the appeal is to be heard, generally of course the circuit
court of appeals.61 The rules provide that preference on the appellate
calendar is to be given to criminal appeals and that the appeal is to be
argued as soon as the state of the calendar permits, but not before
thirty days after the filing of the papers in the appellate court.(" The
petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari must be made within thirty
days after the entry of judgment in the court to which the certiorari is
to be directed.'a The form used is that prescribed in Rules 38 and 39 of
the Supreme Court Rules and the petition is attended by the usual inci-
dents of petition for certiorari.'
Discretion in the regulation of certain matters is left to the various
circuit courts of appeal by the Supreme Court Rule XI. It provides that
"appellate courts"" shall have the power to prescribe rules not incon-
sistent with those of the Supreme Court, with respect to "cost bonds, pro-
cedure on the hearing of appeals, the issue of mandates, and the time
in which petitions for rehearing may be presented." Some circuit courts
have in addition set out the form which an assignment of errors must
follow.6 Likewise the number of copies of the record on appeal to be
printed, and the distribution thereof, have been prescribed by all circuit
59. Rule VIII. The clerk's record of proceedings is composed of "the indictment and
other pleadings and the orders, opinions, and judgment of the trial court2
60. Rule IX. Bills of exceptions must conform to the provisions of Rule 8 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of.the United States, 275 U. S. 622 (1828).
61. Rules VIII and IX. The appellate court may at any time bear a motion by either
party for "correction, amplification or reduction of the record filed with the Appalate
Court."
62. Rule X. 63. Rule XI.
64. See 275 U. S. 622 (1928).
69. Rule I defines "appellate court" as the '"United States Circuit Court of Appals
and the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia."
66. See e.g. Rule 10 of the Rules of the Second Circuit.
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courts of appeal.6 7  Local rules regarding bail and supersedeas are
common in most circuits, although in the Supreme Court's Rules there
are express provisions dealing with both bail and supersedeas. Rule V
provides that the notice of appeal from a conviction operates as a stay
of the execution unless the defendant pending his appeal chooses to begin
serving his sentence. Bail is expressly not to be allowed pending appeal
unless it appears that a substantial question is involved which should be
determined by the appellate court. It is provided that bail may be
granted by the trial judge or by the appellate court, or where it is not
in session, by any district judge or circuit judge. 8 The circuit courts
of appeal in defining further the right to bail, have typically provided
that the appellant may apply for bail to the trial judge, and after refusal,
may on four days' notice repeat the application to the circuit court of
appeal or to.any justice or circuit judge. 9 Bail, if granted, may, how-
ever, be revoked on five days' notice by action of the circuit court of
appeals. 70 Although this practice as to bail is an improvement over the
earlier system, when bail was granted after conviction almost as a
matter of course, it is objectionable in that a defendant can obtain bail
from a judge who has not heard the evidence and who is not furnished
with the record, notwithstanding the trial judge's belief that his case has
no merit.
The new rules incorporate criminal appeals into the general system
of federal appellate jurisdiction. In the main they adequately remedy
the defects of the pre-existing federal appellate practice in criminal cases
and provide a system ostensibly well suited to meet the demands made
upon it. Defects may in time become apparent but so long as the court
is possessed of the power to frame rules, sufficient flexibility is assured
to permit the Supreme Court to meet difficulties as they arise. More-
over, in adopting the expedient of permitting the circuit courts of appeal
to promulgate rules in certain matters, the Supreme Court has demon-
strated that it will not err in attempting arbitrarily to unify a field of law
in which so many of the problems vary locally.
67. See e.g. Rule 21 of the Rules of the Second Circuit. Other matters are also regu.
lated for which reference should be made to the rules of the local circuit.
68. Rule VI.
69. E.g. Rule 32 of the Rules for the Second Circuit. The power, however, of the
circuit courts of appeal to frame such rules is questionable since the Supreme Court
has ruled upon the specific subject.
70. Rule IV.
[Vol, 45
